WikiLeaks logo
The Global Intelligence Files,
files released so far...

The Global Intelligence Files

The Global Intelligence Files

On Monday February 27th, 2012, WikiLeaks began publishing The Global Intelligence Files, over five million e-mails from the Texas headquartered "global intelligence" company Stratfor. The e-mails date between July 2004 and late December 2011. They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an intelligence publisher, but provides confidential intelligence services to large corporations, such as Bhopal's Dow Chemical Co., Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and government agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Marines and the US Defence Intelligence Agency. The emails show Stratfor's web of informers, pay-off structure, payment laundering techniques and psychological methods.

Re: INSIGHT - Turkey used UAVs during the Iraqi incursion [follow-up of discussion - Re: guidance on Turkey]

Released on 2012-03-01 16:00 GMT

Email-ID 1153776
Date 2010-06-17 16:03:19
he says Turkey doesn't need Israeli assistance to fly them. (thus, Israeli
decision to pull UAV instructors is not damaging). but of course, Turks
may need Israeli help to fix if there is a technical problem in UAVs.

Reva Bhalla wrote:

so this source is claiming that Turkey doesn't need Israeli assistance
for the UAVs?
On Jun 17, 2010, at 8:57 AM, Antonia Colibasanu wrote:

SOURCE DESCRIPTION: Confederation source - Sabah (pro-government)

Source says UAVs took off from the UAV air base in Batman (a
southeastern province of Turkey) and provided real-time intelligence
to the Turkish army during Turkish commandos' incursion to the
Northern Iraq yesterday. Turkish army's press release implies this as
well [it says they watched the operation live.emre.] No idea on how
many UAVs were sent to Iraq. Source thinks that Turkey has the
necessary technical capability to fly these birds. [there were reports
few weeks ago that UAVs bought from Israel were transferred to the UAV
air base in Batman.emre]

George Friedman wrote:

On the uav's. They got them. They don't know how to use and maintain
them. Its a problem.

Sent via BlackBerry by AT&T


From: Emre Dogru
Date: Wed, 16 Jun 2010 10:49:39 -0500 (CDT)
To: Analyst List
Subject: Re: guidance on Turkey
Turks realized that the initial passion needs to be backed with
actions and Turkey cannot easily do that now. Turkey keeps repeating
that no military treaty was canceled. The biggest threat that I've
seen so far is to decrease level of diplomatic ties, which is not
much of a threat. This what creates fissure between Gulen and Akp,
because Gulen does not want the relations detoriated only due to
Erdogan's rhetoric, which they think mainly for domestic political
Agree that Pkk is becoming an increasingly pressing issue (I can
tell you how Erdogan is nervous about this and how he lashes out at
every one) But Israel's decision to pull UAV instructors is not
huge. It doesn't make Turkey looser. After all Turkey got six of
them and will get remaining four. Turkey will be able to fly them,
at worst with a little delay. Also, we don't know yet the extent to
which UAVs would be effective against Pkk. Plus, Turkey relies on
real time intel sharing with the us more than Israel. If Israel
starts to lobby on the US to stop this mechanism, that would be the
nightmare of Erdogan.
Chp has a long way to go to gain on Akp for the moment. Their main
criticism is gov's inability on Gaza and Akp knows this. Also, we
have a const amendment package debate ahead, I am sure Erdogan has
several scenarios for that.

Sent from my iPhone
On Jun 16, 2010, at 17:38, George Friedman

The things I didn't want to write from the region.

The Turks have taken a tremendous beating and the Israelis have
come out in remarkably good position.

First, on the tactical side, the Israeli-Turkish intelligence
sharing agreement required that the Turks screen the passengers on
the ships. This screening took place but the Israelis have now
shown the Turks and others intelligence that the Turks either (1)
failed to detect the intentions of a group of people in the
flotilla or their backgrounds) (2) detected it and failed to tell
either Israel or the United States or (3) intentionally deceived
Israel. The passion of the first days has dissipated into internal
feuding. Obviously the CHP is making headway against AKP, The
Gulen-AKP squabble has shaken confidence in the movement, and
there were some quiet comments that Devotoglu (still can't spell
or pronounce his name) is a great man and intellectual but not up
to power politics. I certainly didn't have a chance to reach a
judgment on this. However, I got a clear sense of divisions in
the AKP based on personalities, style and substance. This is not
deeper than the splits in any political party, but its there. The
Israelis are happy as hell. The avalanche hasn't materialized. An
international inquiry isn't going to happen and the Turks have
stopped demanding it, except pro forma. The Turks have discovered
that a propaganda coup works only when you can back it up with
follow-on power and they just don't have that yet.

Second, the Israelis hit them in the one place that really hurts,
pulling trainers on UAVs. Actually these trainers were operating
against the PKK in recce. The Israeli military relationship is
not trivial for the Turks. They are modernizing form a Cold War
military to a modern net-centric force and they have invested
heavily in Israeli equipment. They urgently need this stuff to
deal with PKK and losing these capabilities creates serious
problems. The issue here isn't a coup by the Army or such
nonsense. It is that one of the things AKP must show is their
vigor against the PKK. This is a significant issue in Turkey and
AKP can't put it on hold while they posture against the Israelis.
AKP can really lose the next election over PKK. So, the Israeli
move was a surgical strike against the AKP. This can, of course,
be reversed and that is the point. I met with the Israeli
Ambassador to Azerbaijan and he laid out for me why this isn't the
crisis it appeared and why countermeasures against Turkey really
hurt. We can expect resumption of training and assistance from
the Israelis without announcement.

Third, the Turks got totally hammered by the Egyptians. They
viewed Turkish policy as a direct attack on the Mubarak government
and a threat to Egyptian national security. The Egyptians were
furious on two counts. First, the Turks didn't consult them.
Second, the Turks didn't seem to be aware of Egypt's anti-Hamas
policy or didn't care. The logic of the Turkish position is that
they move from this crisis to leadership in the Arab world. They
could do that, but they can't lead everyone. They need to make
decisions on supporting Hamas and that involves alienating Egypt
and Fatah. They do NOT want to support Hezbollah, but they also
don't want to break with them. The Israelis are offering to end
the Gaza blockade precisely because they know the Egyptians will
do the heavy lifting for them on Hamas. The Turkish policy on no
enemies among their neighbors is unsupportable in the Arab world.
Once you are involved, you will have enemies. The core of their
strategy is not to get deeply involved in such issues. The logic
of the flotilla was to get involved. The divergent logics are
causing a reboot in the Turkish government. The flotilla issue is
bleeding off while they calculate their moves.

They are of course unhappy publicly with the U.S. rejection of
their idea on nuclear weapons. When pressed, they will admit they
were in full consultation with the U.S., expected it and see this
as a part of the negotiating process. The Turks have an odd
naivete. On one level they are completely sophisticated. On
another, they seem to expect to be thanked for first efforts and
are insulted when they aren't. I think this has to do with
Devotuglu who is really a theoretician more than an operator. He
has devoted followers who admire him deeply, but I think his
brittleness and lack of forethought on what comes next may have
hurt him.

The secular-religious shift is unbelievably rigid from the secular
side. I had dinner with a physician whose father was a general,
and there is no give in his position. He seemed serious about
leaving Turkey and he believes AKP will lose the next elections.
I have no idea whether it will or not, but it seemed to me in
several conversations that if AKP wins, that will create a crisis
in the secular side much deeper than it is now. There is a
believe that AKP is a passing event. If it proves not to be, that
will be the critical point.

My read having gone through the region on the flotilla crisis is
that his has not done anything to increase Arab unity, nor has it
bought the Turks into a leadership role. More precisely, the Turks
flinched when they saw the price that leadership would exact. The
Israelis have waged a superb propaganda campaign focusing on the
attack on them and in Europe, a series of articles charging
critics of Israel with anti-antisemitism, written by significant
figures in Europe, has stemmed the hemorrhage. Anti-Muslim and
anti-Turkish feeling in Europe is deeper than anti-Israeli
feeling among the public. Intellectuals and others of course
remain anti-Israeli, but they don't shape political life and the
political leaders are not prepared to go too far with a
pro-Turkish, pro-Arab policy.

Obviously this could all flare up but my view was that the passion
that was present in Turkey when I arrived was dissipated when I
left, and that the government is starting to feel the costs of a
break with Israel. The Israelis will issue a scathing report on
themselves, but only on the failure of planning. Privately, they
are telling the Turks that this crisis was, if not planned by
them, their fault for failing to identify the demonstrators as
they promised they would. This is raising the issue in
Turkey--very quietly--of whether this was planned (and therefore
mishandled in the aftermath) or a mistake (in which case a failure
in execution).

Certainly the sense of Turkish leadership for the Palestinians is
no longer there.

I will have other reports as I recover.
George Friedman
Founder and CEO
700 Lavaca Street
Suite 900
Austin, Texas 78701
Phone 512-744-4319
Fax 512-744-4334

Emre Dogru

Cell: +90.532.465.7514
Fixed: +1.512.279.9468

Emre Dogru

Cell: +90.532.465.7514
Fixed: +1.512.279.9468